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1. Introduction 
The activities of international banks have become an important component of financial 
globalisation since the mid-1990s. Facilitated by financial liberalisation, international banks 
have been one of the major financial sources for the development of emerging market 
economies in recent years. Their increased role in emerging market economies has raised 
questions about their impact on domestic economies and their implications for monetary 
policy. 
International banks’ capital inflows have potentially important implications for financial and 
macroeconomic stability in recipient countries, and arguments as to whether these 
implications are positive or negative have been made in both directions. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that foreign banks can contribute to rapid financial and economic 
development by efficiently allocating resources, playing a stabilising role in the supply of 
foreign exchange credit, and transferring valuable banking technology and expertise. On the 
other, it is claimed that international banks may suddenly expatriate funds from emerging 
markets and thereby increase financial risks in domestic economies. Moreover, international 
banks can be one of the main channels to transmit crises from advanced economies to the 
emerging markets, as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis of 2007–08. It has also 
been argued that the increasing role of international banks complicates the main 
transmission channels of monetary policy.  
The structure of this note is as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of international 
banks’ claims on Korea, followed by Section 3, which reviews their impacts on the domestic 
financial system and economic activities. Section 4 discusses the implications for monetary 
policy and the transmission mechanism of international banks’ activities in Korea, and the 
last section briefly summarises the main implications and points out the challenges ahead. 
2. Characteristics of international banks’ claims on Korea 
International banks’ claims on Korea have been on the rise. Total outstanding claims of 
international banks on Korea (direct cross-border claims of head offices and indirect local 
claims of foreign branches and subsidiaries) increased from $47.8 billion at the end of 1993 
to $76.8 billion at the end of 2000 and $368.7 billion at the end of 2010. Over the same 
years, the ratios of total foreign claims to Korea’s GDP were 12.8%, 16.1%, and 36.3%, 
respectively, also showing an upward trend. 
Some stylised facts on international banks’ claims on Korea are as follows: 
First, during the last 15 years, international banks’ claims on Korea showed considerable 
volatility before and after the two financial crises: the Asian foreign currency crisis and the 
                                                
1  Director General, International Department, Bank of Korea. Research assistance by Sangmin Aum is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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global financial crisis. In the 1990s, international banks’ capital inflows to Korea increased 
mainly due to a rise in overseas direct investment used to offset the current account deficit, 
but they declined sharply after the Asian foreign currency crisis. Net capital flows in 1998 
were –$27.6 billion, in contrast to a total of $43.2 billion between 1995 and 1997. In the same 
manner, in the mid-2000s, international bank inflows to Korea increased dramatically, 
encouraged by strengthened arbitrage incentives and the hedging demands of domestic 
companies in expectation of Korean won appreciation. They then showed a rapid decrease 
after the global financial crisis. While net capital flows between 2005 and 2007 totalled 
$214.8 billion, the figure in 2008 was –$74.8 billion. Although capital flows shifted back to an 
increase in 2009, the volume remains at a low level compared to the period before the crisis. 
Total outstanding foreign claims on Korea at the end of 2007 were greater than those at the 
end of September 2010, at $374.6 billion and $368.7 billion, respectively. 
Second, dividing international banks’ claims on Korea into cross-border and local claims, we 
find significant differences within time periods. In the 1990s, cross-border claims of head 
offices took up most of the foreign claims on Korea. Local claims of foreign branches started 
to increase in 2005, but cross-border claims again increased rapidly after restrictions were 
placed on fund-raising between head offices and their foreign branches in July 2007. Both 
types of claims decreased during the 2008 global financial crisis, but have turned to 
increasing trends since 2009 (Graph 1). 
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1  Foreign claims = international claims + local-in-local claims.    2  International claims = cross-border 
claims + local-in-foreign claims.    3  Cross-border claims = claims of international banks’ head 
offices.    4  Local-in-local claims = local currency claims of foreign affiliates.    5  Local-in-foreign  
claims = foreign currency claims of foreign affiliates. 
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics. 
Third, the ratio of international banks’ claims on Korea to its nominal GDP was 36.3% at the 
end of 2010, a figure that is very high compared to other major emerging countries. The 
increasing trend of capital inflows has also been very strong compared to other emerging 
countries. Between 2004 and 2010, the ratio of foreign claims to GDP rose by 
16.2 percentage points (Table 1). 
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Table 1 
International banks’ claims on emerging market economies 
As a percentage of nominal GDP 
Country 2004 (A) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sep 2010 (B) B–A 
Brazil 16.3 17.4 19.6 20.5 21.3 21.4 22 5.7 
Peru 18.5 19.3 16.7 22.6 26.7 23.9 24.7 6.2 
Thailand 24.5 25.1 24.1 21.7 21.5 24.5 25.3 0.8 
Taiwan 22 21.8 21 27.5 23.9 28.6 32.5 10.5 
Korea 20 25.7 29.6 36 36.8 38.3 36.3 16.2 
Indonesia 15.2 15.9 15.2 16 14.7 12.7 13.9 –1.3 
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics.  
 
Fourth, until 2008, the volume of loans to the banking sector had been similar to that of loans 
to the non-banking sector, including the public sector and private companies. Since 2009, 
however, loans to the non-banking sector have rapidly recovered, while loans to banks have 
stagnated (Graph 2). 
Lastly, the volume of local claims in foreign currency and in Korean won together is larger 
than that of cross-border claims. As of September 2010, the local claims-to-GDP ratio was 
19.1%, whereas the cross-border claims-to-GDP ratio was 15.7%. However, the trend of 
increase in cross-border claims is stronger than that in local claims. Between 2004 and 
September 2010, their claims-to-GDP ratios rose by 8.6 and 6.7 percentage points, 
respectively. The ratio of local claims in Korean won to Korea’s nominal GDP was 14.2% at 
the end of September 2010, very high compared to the 4.9% ratio of local claims in foreign 
currency to GDP (Table 2). 
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Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics. 
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Table 2 
International banks’ claims on emerging market economies, by type 
As a percentage of nominal GDP 
Country 2004 (A) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sep 2010 (B) B–A 
Cross-border claims 
Brazil 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.8 7.7 8.0 8.4 3.5 
Peru 3.8 8.5 4.0 6.3 6.7 4.6 5.7 2.0 
Thailand 5.3 5.6 6.3 5.5 5.7 6.2 5.3 0.0 
Taiwan 7.3 6.9 7.0 8.4 4.7 10.0 12.6 5.3 
Korea 7.1 7.4 9.2 14.0 14.8 15.5 15.7 8.6 
Indonesia 5.0 4.8 4.8 6.4 5.8 4.7 5.9 0.9 
Local-in-foreign claims 
Brazil 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 
Peru 6.7 5.2 9.0 8.6 12.0 10.9 10.1 3.4 
Thailand 3.9 4.9 2.4 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.7 -2.2 
Taiwan 2.0 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.6 3.1 4.6 2.7 
Korea 2.4 2.4 3.4 4.3 5.5 5.6 4.9 2.5 
Indonesia 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.0 2.2 1.9 -2.3 
Local-in-local claims 
Brazil 9.1 10.9 12.3 13.1 13.1 12.8 13.0 3.9 
Peru 4.8 4.8 3.3 6.7 7.0 7.6 7.7 2.9 
Thailand 12.8 12.8 13.8 13.6 13.0 15.5 17.0 4.2 
Taiwan 9.8 10.0 10.5 16.5 16.3 14.8 14.1 4.3 
Korea 10.0 15.3 15.9 15.8 15.0 15.4 14.2 4.2 
Indonesia 2.9 4.0 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.8 4.0 1.1 
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics.  
3. Effects of capital inflows from international banks 
3.1  Positive effects 
International banks have contributed to economic growth both directly, by stimulating 
investment through the supply of foreign capital, and indirectly, by inducing development in 
financial industries and improving macroeconomic policy discipline (Kose et al (2006)). 
Many empirical studies, including Dages et al (2000), EBRD (2009), and Herrmann and 
Mihaljek (2010), confirm that the supply of funds to emerging economies by international 
banks has a positive impact on financial and macroeconomic stability. 
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3.1.1 Stable supply of foreign capital 
International banks have functioned as a stable supplier of low-cost foreign capital to Korea. 
The ratio of international bank claims to Korea’s total international investment position (IIP) 
liabilities rose from 31.6% in 2004 to 46.5% at the end of 2010 (Graph 3). 
Since the mid-2000s, Korea has been very active in raising foreign currency funds, especially 
through foreign bank branches. The share of total foreign debt that was financed by foreign 
bank branches increased from 32% at the end of 2004 to 39% in 2010 (Graph 4). Foreign 
bank branches have provided relatively inexpensive foreign capital, as they have brought the 
funds from their own countries, paying a low cost (Graph 5).  
Graph 3 
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Sources: Bank of Korea; BIS. 
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3.1.2 Contributing to deepening of financial markets 
Capital inflows from international banks are accompanied by the collateral benefits of 
domestic financial industry development: they expand competition for domestic banks, 
propagate management techniques and strengthen surveillance. In Korea, empirical analysis 
suggests that a 1% increase in capital inflows from international banks reduces domestic 
banks’ bid-ask interest rate spread by 0.08 percentage points over 12 quarters (Graph 6). 
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International banks also contribute to expansion of the demand base in the domestic capital 
market. The share of foreigners’ investments, mainly those of international banks, in Korea’s 
domestic stock and fixed income markets has increased consistently (Graph 7). Since the mid-
2000s, the pattern of international banks’ investment in securities has changed, similarly to that 
of the investment behaviour of foreigners as a whole in securities. In the fixed income market, 
the share of bonds owned by foreigners has risen from 0.5% at the end of 2004 to 6.6% as of 
February 2011. In the stock market, meanwhile, the share of stocks owned by foreigners rose 
to 42% in 2004, then fell to 29% at the end of 2008, and has now increased again to 32% as of 
February 2011 (Graph 8). 
3.2 Negative effects 
3.2.1 Increase in financial system risks 
The fund management behaviour of international banks is very closely associated with 
financial system stability in emerging market countries. When there is a large difference 
between a financial institution’s foreign currency assets and foreign currency debts (currency 
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mismatch), or between its short-term foreign currency assets and short-term foreign currency 
debts (maturity mismatch), the risk of experiencing a foreign currency liquidity crisis is high.  
Korean banks’ currency and maturity mismatches have increased greatly since the mid-
2000s. They have abated somewhat in the wake of the global financial crisis, but remain 
elevated (Graph 9). As banks’ short-term debts, mainly those of foreign bank branches, 
increased sharply during 2006 and 2007, the external debt structure of Korea weakened and 
the amount of net external assets in debt instruments decreased rapidly (Table 3). This 
aggravated the foreign exchange market’s instability during the global financial crisis, 
because unease about the capability of Korea to redeem its foreign debts spread among 
foreign investors.  
Graph 9 Table 3 
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Since 2005, the currency and maturity mismatch problems of the banking sector have come 
to the fore mainly at foreign bank branches. Foreign bank branches’ currency mismatches 
reached a peak of –$73.7 billion at the end of March 2008, 11 times greater than the 
domestic banks’ contemporary currency mismatches of –$6.7 billion (Graph 10). Meanwhile, 
foreign bank branches’ maturity mismatches at the end of September 2008 amounted to  
–$60 billion, six times those of domestic banks (Graph 11). 
3.2.2 Expansion of cyclical fluctuations 
Foreign capital inflows to Korea are procyclical. This is most apparent for foreign debts and 
borrowings, and arises because the funding cost of capital for foreign borrowing becomes 
cheaper as the sovereign risk premium is reduced during economic booms, while the 
opposite occurs during economic downturns (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
Ratio of net foreign capital inflows to GDP 
Borrowing 
  Total flow FDI Equity Debt  Short Long Bank Short Long 
Boom 3.75* 0.65 0.47 1.83** 0.81* 1.19** –0.38 1.14* 1.19** –0.05 
Downturn 0.76* 0.81 1.13 0.37** –1.57* –2.02** 0.45 –1.19* –1.63** 0.44 
Analysis between Q1 1998 and Q4 2010. The economic booms and downturns are distinguished by 
comparison between year-on-year real GDP growth rates and year-on-year long-term trend rates.  
* and ** imply statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, during the booms and downturns.  
 
Granger causality tests between foreign capital inflows and GDP suggest that long- and 
short-term foreign borrowing clearly Granger-causes GDP, while it is hard to find statistically 
significant causality between other forms of foreign capital inflows and GDP. As for short-
term borrowing, unidirectional causality from foreign borrowing to GDP exists, along with 
bidirectional causality between long-term borrowing and GDP (Table 5). 
In the process, the foreign exchange rate acts as a financial accelerator. For example, during 
economic booms the expectation of currency appreciation brings about banks’ foreign capital 
inflows, while during downturns the reverse happens: the procyclicality of capital inflows 
expands through the exchange rate. Generally, there is a positive correlation between 
currency value and economic growth, as shown in Graph 12. In the case of Korea, when it 
showed around 5% annual GDP growth in 2005–07, foreign capital inflows increased as the 
expectations of currency appreciation caused a rise in the swap rate and a positive arbitrage 
condition level (Graph 13). 
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Table 5 
Granger causality tests between foreign capital flows and GDP 
Null hypothesis k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 
Total ⇍  GDP 2.24 0.83 0.53 0.63 
Total ⇏  GDP 1.8 2.12 1.87 1.3 
FDI ⇍  GDP 1.29 0.7 0.47 0.71 
FDI ⇏  GDP 0.19 0.15 0.59 0.45 
Equity ⇍  GDP 0.78 0.41 0.31 0.26 
Equity ⇏  GDP 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.13 
Debt ⇍  GDP 0.89 0.25 0.77 0.49 
Debt ⇏  GDP 1.08 1.72 1.54 1.19 
Borrowing ⇍  GDP 2.2 1.08 0.4 0.31 
Borrowing ⇏  GDP 0.18 1.45 1.58 1.18 
Short-term ⇍  GDP 1.03 1.58 1.1 0.87 
Short-term ⇏  GDP 20.42*** 8.55*** 5.31*** 3.77** 
Long-term ⇍  GDP 0.94 9.35*** 2.45* 0.98 
Long-term ⇏  GDP 51.05*** 15.24*** 8.35*** 6.06*** 
Total ⇍  GDP 2.24 0.83 0.53 0.63 
*, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, during the booms and 
downturns. 
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4. Implications for monetary policy 
The increasing role of international banks affects the transmission of monetary policy through 
the interest rate, exchange rate and credit channels. 
4.1 Interest rate channel 
Capital inflows from international banks can limit the effect of monetary policy because they 
weaken the connection between long- and short-term interest rates by pushing the former 
down. In 2005–06, for example, with capital financed from their main offices, the branches of 
international banks exchanged US dollars for won through CRS trades with Korean domestic 
banks and invested the won in domestic bonds, pressuring market interest rates to fall. Also 
in 2007 and in 2009–10, the increase in international banks’ head offices’ investment in 
Korean treasury bonds, for buy and hold purposes, restrained the rise of long-term interest 
rates, despite the rise in the policy rate (Graphs 14 and 15). 
We estimated the following model of Peiris (2010) in order to empirically confirm the effect of 
foreign capital inflows on the treasury bond yields. 
tititittitititititiiti FPCAUSrymdbSrLR ,,9,87,6,5,4,3,2,1,   
where LR is the long-term interest rate, Sr is the policy rate, π  is inflation, b equals budget 
balance / GDP, d is government debt, m is monetary (M2) increase rate, y equals the GDP 
growth rate, USr is American bond interest rate, CA is current account deficit / GDP, and FP 
equals the share of foreign investors in the bond market. 
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Table 6 
Analysis of determinants of national bond interest rate 
 Coefficient P-value 
Constant 4.195 0.000 
Policy rate 0.445 0.000 
Inflation 0.046 0.000 
Fiscal balance / GDP 0.011 0.006 
CA deficit / GDP 0.025 0.101 
Foreign participation –0.051 0.000 
Adj R2 0.938  
F-statistics 252.904 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Panel data for Q1 2000 – Q3 2010 from four Asian developing nations (Korea, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand) were used, with the insignificant variables excluded by the general-
to-specific method. The fixed effects were considered, allowing for the heterogeneities in 
levels and variations of nations’ interest rates. 
Empirical analysis showed that when the rate of foreign investment increased by 1%, market 
interest rates decreased by about 5 basis points (Table 6). 
4.2 Exchange rate channel 
The capital inflow from international banks influences the exchange rate channel of monetary 
policy by changing the connection between the exchange rate and economic fluctuations. 
According to the analyses of Calvo (2001) and Kamin and Rogers (2000), if the exchange 
rates of newly developing nations with external debts increase (depreciation), the effects of 
economic retrenchment due to the burden of debt redemption, ie negative balance sheet 
effects, could be bigger than the effects of economic expansion due to improved exports. 
With reference to the existing analysis of exchange rate effects on total demand,2 analysis 
was conducted on Korea. 
                                                
2  Related research includes (i) research using VAR (eg Rogers and Wang (1995), Copelman and Werner (1996), 
Hoffmaister and Vegh (1996), Kamin and Rogers 2000), (ii) research using regression analysis (eg Agenor 
(1991), Cespedes (2005), Galindo et al (2003)) and (iii) research using micro data (eg Bleakley and Cowan 
(2002), Harvey and Roper (1999), Aguiar (2005), Martinez and Werner (2002)). 
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Graph 16 
Change of exchange rate channel due to debt dollarisation 
4.2.1 VAR analysis 
First, we estimate a VAR model for Q1 1990 – Q4 2010 composed of seven variables: 
foreign interest rate, domestic interest rate, real exchange rate, current account / GDP, real 
bank loans, inflation and real GDP. 
When the exchange rate varies due to changes in internal and external interest rates, two 
contrary effects on GDP are shown – through current account changes (conventional 
exchange rate channel) and credit sector changes (exchange rate channel with debt 
dollarisation). 
The results show that when the exchange rate increases (won depreciation), regardless of 
improvement in the current account, economic activity contracts due to a decline in real 
credit (Graph 17). 
Graph 17 
Impulse response to real exchange rate shock (1%) 
In per cent 
Current account and credit Output 
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Cuurent account/GDP
Real  credi t
 
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
±2 s tandard deviation
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Monetary policy 
easing 
Exchange rate 
depreciation 
Stimulations of 
exports 
Economic 
expansion 
Increase in real value 
of external liabilities 
Economic 
contraction 
<Exchange Rate Channel with Debt Dollarizsation> 
<Conventional Exchange Rate Channel>
BIS Papers No 57 227
 
 
4.2.2 Regression analysis 
Next, regression analysis was conducted on the following equation:  
  tttttt rXDebteeY  321  
where tY  equals GDP growth rate, te  is real exchange rate fluctuation, Debtt is external 
debt/GDP and Xt equals other controlled variables (private sector credit / GDP, US interest 
rate, US growth rate and terms of trade) for the period Q1 1994 – Q4 2010. 
Exchange rate fluctuation has a positive effect on growth rate due to the improvement of the 
current account  02  , but also a negative effect that correlates positively to the quantity of 
external debts  03  ,. The ultimate net effect on GDP of exchange rate fluctuation in the 
period t therefore depends upon the level of external debt  tttt DebteY 32/  . 
The analysis results, 2 = 0.22 (t-statistic: 2.07) and 3 = –0.94 (t-statistic: –3.22), show that 
when the ratio of external debt to GDP is 23.8%  32 /  or greater, the exchange rate 
effect on GDP is negative (Graph 18). In the early 2000s, the effect remained positive, but 
when external debt increased rapidly from 2007, the effect turned negative. 
  tttttt XDebtBankseeY  321  
Also, when analysed using total external debt instead of banks’ external debts, the results 
showed 2  = 0.19 (t-statistic: 2.06) and 3  = –1.60 (t-statistic: –3.35), indicating that when 
the external debt ratio is at or over 11.7%  32 / , the effect of the exchange rate on GDP 
becomes negative (Graph 18). 
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Graph 19 Graph 20 
Foreign currency liabilities and local 
currency claims of foreign bank affiliates 
Year on year, in per cent 
Relationship between foreign  
borrowing and domestic liquidity 
In per cent 
Sources: Author’s calculations; BIS. Sources: Bank of Korea; author’s calculations. 
4.3 Credit channel 
Capital inflows through international banks influence domestic monetary policy conditions 
through the credit channel, which can be subcategorised into two channels: (i) the bank 
lending channel, and (ii) the money supply channel.  
First, through the bank lending channel, an increase in foreign borrowing expands the 
lending sources of financial institutions, which leads to credit growth resulting in an economic 
boom (Graph 19). Second, through the money supply channel, the money supply increases 
during the process of the authority’s intervention in the foreign exchange market in response 
to the expansion of foreign capital inflows (Graph 20).3 
Estimations using a three-variable VAR model (cyclical factors of real GDP, real loan and 
real capital inflows) also show that banks’ foreign borrowing causes increases in real loans 
and real GDP (Graph 21).  
                                                
3  Fully sterilised foreign exchange intervention by the monetary authority does not give rise to money growth. In 
this case, however, money growth could be brought about since the issuance of monetary stabilisation bonds 
increases payments of interest on them. 
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Graph 21 
Responses of credit and output variables to foreign borrowing shock 
In per cent 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
5. Challenges ahead 
International banks’ claims on Korea are huge, and they cause a high level of capital flow 
volatility compared to other major emerging countries. Since the recent global financial crisis, 
cross-border claims through international banks’ head offices have been growing rapidly, 
while the trend of increase in local claims through foreign banks’ branches has eased. 
The analysis on international banks’ claims suggests the following policy implications: 
First, international banks’ claims have positive impacts through the provision of stable 
sources of foreign funds and indirect spillover effects. However, these positive effects are 
accompanied by negative influences on the domestic economy as well: increased economic 
volatility and unrest in the financial system. Therefore, policy efforts to prevent the negative 
impacts derived from international banks’ claims are needed.  
Second, the expansion of international banks’ claims causes uncertainty surrounding 
monetary policy conditions to increase, thus making monetary policy operations difficult. The 
monetary authority needs to deal appropriately with changes in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism by analysing their effects on long-term interest rates and exchange 
rates.  
Third, as a countermeasure to increased volatility in capital inflows and outflows, robust 
economic fundamentals should be sustained through operation of stable macroeconomic 
policies, complemented by a strengthening of prudential policies. In particular, Korea needs 
to make sustained efforts towards the successful implementation of its recently adopted 
macroprudential measures.4 
Fourth, efforts to narrow information gaps between financial institutions and the policy 
authorities should be intensified, to alleviate risks stemming from capital inflows and outflows 
                                                
4  These macroprudential measures include ceilings on banks’ FX derivatives positions (from October 2010), 
flexible withholding taxation on foreigners’ Korean treasury bond and monetary stabilisation bond investment 
(from January 2011), and a macroprudential stability levy on non-core foreign currency liabilities (to be 
introduced in the second half of 2011). 
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and to ensure the stability of the financial sector. Elaboration on statistics about international 
banks’ claims is especially important to prevent the maturity mismatch problem that could 
easily result from increases in those claims.  
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